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Suspect Arrested After Allegedly Defrauding Over 20 Families In Polk County With Elaborate Fraudulent Fencing Scam

On December 18, 2023 The Polk County Sheriff’s Office took into custody a man they claim defrauded over 20 Polk families in elaborate Fence Installation scam. A warrant was issued back in March of 2021. The suspect also has outstanding warrants in Lake, Seminole, Orange, and Osceola County for similar charges. The suspect Adam Cronenwett, DOB 11/12/1974, allegedly stole someone’s identity, set up bank accounts, cashed checks and other forms of deception. Below is an excerpt of the arrests affidavit:

It should be noted that this is an unedited report of facts by the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. These facts are up for question and everyone is entitled to question the validity of facts by law enforcement in a court of law. Daily Ridge does not rewrite these facts as some meanings or interpretations could be in error and change context. We hope readers appreciate being able to read the information and come to your own conclusion.

“During the month of June and July, 2020, the Polk County Sheriff’s Office was contacted by residents of Davenport and Haines City in regards to possible fraudinvolving acompany named “Family Fence”. The victims reside at different new home developments in the area, and reported they learned about the company after locating flyers advertising the company. The flyers were being placed on the front doors, for homeowners to easily locate them.

The flyer listed the company’s name and telephone number: (407) 755-7693. The telephone number wasregistered July 4, 2019 through Verizon, and information received via subpoena revealed the account was opened under subscriber name, Jeffery Cox.


The homeowners reported when they contacted the telephone number, a male subject identifying himself as “Jeff’ or “Jeff Cox” would answer the telephone call and would make the negotiations with the homeowners.


The homeowners were advised prior to be given aquote, arepresentative from the company would respond to takemeasurements of the area to be fenced. Days later, different employees would be sent tothe residents to complete the cask.
The homeowners would later receive emails from email addresses listing the company’s name, containing a quote and adown payment request. The homeowners would be instructed to complete the payments via Zelle using receiver telephone number, 407-558-8780.


Subpoena response from Verizon revealed the telephone number was a prepaid telephone registered to “Family Fence’


Homeowners not able to pay via Zelle, were offered other payment options such as checks, money orders, cash, or credit card. Those payments were collected at a later time by other employees.
While completing the investigation, I also learned Haines City Police Department and Davemport Police Department were also receiving reports for similar incidents involving the company. I communicated with Det. Francisco (HCPD) and Det. Luna (DPD)a n d their investigations were forwarded to me for follow up as a countywide incident.


During that time, I also received emails and telephone calls from other homeowners who became aware oft h e investigation. I obtained bank records for the homeowners who paid by check, credit card, and Zelle. I also obtained records for the money order used as payments.


I evaluated the information obtained and learned the checks and Zelle payments were deposited/disbursed into two different Chase Bank accounts, one Regions Bank account, and one SuncoastCredit Unionaccount. Several money orders were cashed.

Chase Bank account number REDACTED received the bulk of the payments. Such account was opened on August 21, 2019 under the name “Family Fence LL”. Donald Joseph Tomko and Jeffery W. Cox were the authorized signer on the account.


Regions Bank account number REDACTED was opened on April 2, 2020 under the name “Family Fence LLC”. Donald J. Tomko was the only authorized signer on the account.


Chase Bank account number REDACTED was used to receive a Zelle payment. Such account belongs to Katie Ellen Hayes-Osborn.

Suncoast Credit Union account number REDACTED used to receive two money orders. The account belongs to Alyssa Demaris.

Several money orders were cashed at ACE Cash Express by Donald Tomko. It should be noted, during a review of the company’s bank records, several recurring payments made to different subjects were noted. I identifiedchecks recipients, Maria Jose Chacon Carrero and Kilany Paola Cruz as employees for the company. Other subjects were also receiving payments from the company’s bank records. The bank records also revealed numerous transactions pertaining to transfers for Katie Hayes-Osborn via Zelle.


Using investigative sources, I completed various researches of the names developed throughout the course of this investigation. During the research, I noticed Katie Hayes-Osborn has been previously linked to a subject named “Adam Cronenwett, who has several warrants issued for his arrests for similar incidents. Based on the reports, it appears that Katie and Adam are/were involved i nan intimate relationship.


During the research, I located a report from Ocoee Police Department (OCPD200FF002415) indicating on June 20, 2020, Officer Kelly responded to a call for service in reference to a disturbance. Once on scene, Officer Kelly identified the involved subjects as Katie Ellen Hayes-Osborn and Jeffery Wesley Cox via Florida Driver License.


The report indicates there is body camera footage of this incident.


I contacted Ococe PD Records Section and requested a copy of the body camera footage. Upon receiving the footage, it was noticed the subjects involved matched Katie Hayes-Osborn and Adam Cronenwett physical appearance. I also noticed Adam provided the officer a Florida Driver License to Jeffery Cox. During such incident, I was able to listen to the officer reading the license number. At that time, I conducted a search of the license numberand discovered it matchesthe number for Jeffery Wesley Cox’s driver license.


I met with Alyssa Ann Demaris, who advised she is Ms. Hayes-Osborn’s sister. Ms. Demaris advised the two money orders deposited into her account were given by Ms. Hayes-Osborn for Ms. Demaris to cash it and use the cash to pay for Ms. Hayes-Osborn’s rent. According to Ms. Demaris, she agreed to assist Ms. Hayes-Osborn with the help given that she was not in town at the time. According to Ms. Demaris, she believed the money orders were purchased by Ms. Hayes-Osborn, and did not know the money orders were associated with payments for the company. Ms. Demaris advised she knows Adam Cronenwett as being Ms. Hayes-Osborn’s boyfriend. Ms. Demaris also knows Mr.Cronenwett has an extensive criminal background due to his drug habits and fraudulent history. Ms. Demaris advised Mr. Cronenwett is known for committing the same crimes in different counties using different fence companies. Ms. Demaris advised she has heard Ms. Hayes-Osborn commenting about Mr. Cronenwett’s alias “Jeff Cox”. Ms. Demaris advised she believes both Ms. Haves-Osborn and Mr. Cronenwett operated the fraudulent businesses together.


I presented Ms. Demaris the footages obtained from Ocoee PD and she identified the subject using Jeffery Wesley Cox identification card as Adam Cronenwett. Ms. Demaris advised without a doubt, Mr. Cronenwett is the person seen on video and the identification card does not belong to him.


On December 4, 2020, contact was made with Kilany Paola Cruz, who based on the company’s bank records, received payments during themonth of June, 2020. Ms. Cruz positively identified Mr. Cronenwett as the person using “Jeff Cox”.
On January 29, 2021, I interviewed Ms. Cruz and she advised she did not know M r .Cronenwett’s true identity. Ms. Cruz advised her friend, Wilson Xavier Rodriguez Talavera, offered to assist her obtaining a job with Family Fence. During that time, Mr. Rodriguez was employed by the company. Ms. Cruz agreed to work for FamilyFence, and she was later hired to complete surveys of the client’s properties and collect payments. Ms. Cruz was responsible for providing the information to the installers and providing the payments to who she believed was “Jeff Cox”. Ms. Cruz advised on several instances, she travelled to the Tampa area and met with Mr.Tomko, who on some occasions would receive the client’s checks, cash them, and send “Jeff Cox” the cash. Ms. Cruz stated she did not know the company was involved in fraudulent activities however, towards the end of her employment she became suspicious given that several employees were complaining about not being paid and several clients were complaining about their fences not being installed.


Ms. Cruz stated she does not know Mr. ‘Tomko’s involvement in the company however, “Jeff Cox” was the person responsible for the daily operations and was known to be the company’s owner.
On February 3, 2021, contact was made with Maria Chacon Carrero, who based on the company’s bank records received payments during the months of May and June, 2020. Ms. Chacon positively identified Mr. Cronenwett as the person using “Jeff Cox” I interviewed Ms. Chacon and she advised she did not know Mr. Cronenwett’s true identity. Ms. Chacon advised she never met Mr. Tomko in person and she never met Ms. Hayes-Osborn either. Ms. Chacon advised she was employed with the company as a secretary, and was responsible for scheduling the client’s appointments with the
company and the installation dates. Ms. Chacon stated she did not know the company was involved in fraudulent activitics however, she did noticed numerous clients were complaining about their fence not being installed. Ms. Chacon advised the contracts and internet operation for the company was handled by Helder Ames, who resides
in Venezuela. According to Ms. Chacon, Helder was employed as a freelancer to work remotely. Ms. Chacon advised she worked from her residence using a VolP to communicate with the clients.
Throughout the course of this investigation, and after reviewing the company’s bank record thoroughly, I identified additional victims outside of Polk County. I met with those victim and obtained their statements.


I obtained reports from Osceola County Sheriff’s Office and Winter Garden Police Department involving incidents in their area.


I inspected the ID number for Jeffery W. Cox listed on Family Fence LLC’s J.P. Morgan Chase Bank account signer form (signed by suspect on August 26,2019) and noticed it matched the license number given to Ocoee PD. Using investigative sources, I obtain a telephone number for Mr. Cox, who was immediately contacted.


During a meeting with Mr. Cox, he denied ever having any affiliation with Family Fence LLC, and he has never heard of the company. Mr. Cox denied being added to the bank account held by the company. Mr. Cox acknowledge the identification card number listed on the signer form matches his license number however, he advised such form was not signed by him and he did not authorized anyone to sign on his behalf. Mr. Cox advised he works as a truck driver and he recalls several years ago, he lost his wallet containing his driver license. Mr. Coz was unable to recall all the details surrounding the loss of his wallet. Mr. Cox advised he does not know who signed the form and used his name to operate the business. Mr. Cox stated he was not aware of the situation until I contacted him. Mr. Cox reviewed the video provided by Ocoee PD and advised he does not know who are the subjects seen on the videos. Mr. Cox was able to see when the suspect on the video provides the officer an identification card, at which time, he recognized the photograph on the identification card as a previous photograph he had on an old driver license. Mr. Cox does not know how the subject took possession of the driver license. Mr. Cox stated he wish to pursue criminal charges against the subject who used his personal identification information to operate the business.


On March 22,2021, I made contact with Mr. Tomko, who was able to identify Mr. Cronenwett and Ms. Hayes- Osborn from a photo lineup presented by an independent administrator.


During my interview with Mr. Tomko, he advised he knows Mr.Cronensett’s sister, and she introduced them. Mr. ‘Tomko was advised Mr. Cronenwett was an expert in fence installation and putting teams together and he knew the business. According to Mr. Tomko, Mr. Cronenwett had a bad credit history and numerous legal issues therefore, he was unable to sustain initiating the business himself. Mr. Tomko stated he was good with finances and customer service.


Mr. Tomko stated he agreed to join Mr. Cronenwett in the business and claims he believed Mr. Cronenwett was called “Jeff Cox”. According to Mr. Tomko, he obtain a personal credit card for the business. Such credit card was for a pickup truck weekly rental, a trailer for materials,worker’s compensation,licenses, and have flyers delivered door-to-door. The company had a material supplier, and Mr.Tomko claims he obtained another line of credit at Home Depot for materials and supplies. All installers and administrative personnel were considered independent contractors. Mr. Cronenwett maintained a spreadsheet on jobs, payroll, and other expenses.


Mr. Tomko then proceeded to explain the company’s operational process. According to Mr. Tomko, during the first months, Mr. Tomko discovered the permit process could take several weeks and approval was needed from the different homeowner’s associations. The process was to collect half the money up front from the customers and the balance was due upon completion of the job. When customers called for an estimate, Mr. Tomko advised he was the one who would do the estimate and Mr. Cronenwett would put together the proposal and email it to the customers. If the customers agreed, Mr. Tomko would pick up the check and have them take a picture of his ID to show as the one retrieving the funds. According to Mr. Tomko, be would then give Mr. Cronenwett all the funds collected for deposit or he would deposit them via ATM. Jobs were being completed
but money was-put back into the business.

Mr.Tomko explained to get jobs and reputation in the Orlando area, the prices they gave were always the lowest price in the market. Between June and September of 2019, the company successfully installed between 15 and 20 fences. Mr. Tomko also claimed when he noticed Mr. Cronenwett was behind in payroll, Mr. Tomko gave him $5,000.00 of his personal funds to the company. Mr. Tomko claims he then began having issues covering his personal expenses such as rent, while spending ample time working for the company. For such reason, Mr. Tomko and Mr. Cronenwett agreed for Mr. Tomko to receive $500.00 a month from the company’s funds. After several months, Mr. Tomko was struggling to maintain his personal expenses and therefore he advised Mr. Cronenwett he would no longer be “hands-on” with the company any longer. Mr. Tomko initially continued to pick up checks on occasions and help with paper work every other week however, he was not involved daily any longer.


Mr.Tomko stated he knew that it would be difficult to replace his services given that he was the one with experience with finances as well as customer service. Mr.Tomko claimed he repeatedly advised Mr. Cronenwett he needed to make sure that he completed all of the installs that were scheduled or give a refund.


Mr. Tomko claims after not being involved with the company’s daily operation, he began to receive complaints from customer and began noticing Mr. Cronenwett did not appear to be using the funds to cover personal expenses such as lodging and rent.
Mr. Tomko was shown the bank records and he was unable to explain the numerous ATM withdrawals completed with the debit card assigned to Mr. Cronenwett.


Between December 19, 2019 and July 22,2020, the Chase account belong to Family Fence received deposits totaling $110,571.21. The deposits were made in the form of remote onlinedeposits, Zelle payments, Square, Inc. payments, ATM deposits, and cash deposits.


During that same time,the suspect’s debit card associated with the account under-the name of “Jeffery Wesley Cox” was used to complete ATM cash withdrawals and transactions not consistent with the act of installing fences totaling $21,713.99.


It should be noted a total of $55,868.43 were electronically withdrawn from the account. Due to the lack of information documented on the account’s monthly statements, I am unable to determine how much of those funds were not used for business purposes.


Between April and August of 2020, the Regions account belonging to Family Fence received deposits totaling $39,604.58. During that same time, the debit cards associated with the account were used to complete ATM cash withdrawals and transactions not consistent with the act of installing fences totaling $8,490.38.


It should be noted, during conversations with Mr. Tomko, it was learned Mr. Cronenwett was in possession of the debit cards.

Throughout the course ofthisinvestigation,I also learnedMr. Cronenwett has previously operated businesses under the names: Metro Fences LIC and Heartland Fences LLC. Mr. Cronenwett also has active warrants for his arrest from Polk County forScheme to Defraud and Grand Theft, Polk County for Grand theft, Pinellas Countyfor GrandTheft and Unlicensed Contracting, Hernando County for Organized Fraud and Grand Theft, Pasco County for Scheme to Defraud, and Manatee County for Scheme to Defraud.


Based on the information gathered throughout the course of this investigation, I have probable cause to believe the suspect, Adam Andrew Cronenwett willfully and without authorization fraudulently used, and possessed withintent to fraudulently use, personal identification information concerning Jeffery Wesley Cox, without first obtaining that person’s consent on two occasions violating FSS. 817.568(2)(A). The suspect submitted a signed Chase Bank Business Account Signers Form and deposited fraudulent checks violating FSS. 831.02. The suspect engaged on a systematic, ongoing course of conduct with intent to obtain property (funds) from homeowners by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises or willful misrepresentations of a future act over $50,000.00 violating FSS. 817.034(4)(A)I. Mr. Cronenwett also victimized more than 20 persons, and thereby obtained more than $50,000.00 violating FSS. 775.0844(5)(B). The suspect knowingly obtained funds from the following victims, exceeding $20,000.00 with intent to appropriate the property to his own use of use of any person not entitled to the use of the property violating FSS. 812.014(2)(C)I:


The crimes involved activities in multiple jurisdiction including Polk, Lake, Seminole, Orange, and Osceola County. “

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